Human Rights, Censorship

This summary is part of a research project carried out between March and October 2006 in support of the International Institute for Communication and Development (IICD), one of The Communication Initiative (The CI)'s partners.

In the lead up to open hostilities in Yugoslavia, as various media outlets began to broadcast ethnically intolerant criticism of anti-government groups, Belgrade’s Radio B92 refused to participate in race-baiting and pro-Serbian censored government statements. As a result, the station came under the scrutiny of pro-government censors and a secret police apparatus that actively attempted to close and inhibit the station’s news distribution.

Attention began focusing on Radio B92 when it distributed information by a critical group of purged university professors, docents, assistants and researchers - called ETF Monkeys - about the government’s attacks on independent universities in Yugoslavia. After the Serbian government adopted legislation regulating activities at universities and overseeing a subsequent purge of ‘politically unsuitable’ personnel (a total of 58), the ETF Monkeys began distributing news and commentary against the Serbian government and ruling elites.

Despite several attempts to shut down Radio B92, some of which were temporarily successful, Radio B92 managed to distribute its reports domestically via information and communication technology (ICT) cooperation with international allies. Principally, Radio B92’s efforts revolved around internet (streaming audio in Real Audio format) and email news services.

The author asserts that once the government realised that its efforts for full closure were unsuccessful, it encouraged its allies and agents to commit minor isolated attacks on the internet servers aiding Radio B92 and its associated un-censored allies. The author cites four specific types of government-induced internet censorship tactics: investigating Radio B92 staff’s email communications with foreigners (1992); infiltrating OpenNet with secret police informants (1996); pressuring Telecommunications providers to give access to encrypted files (1997); and lastly, hijacking the domains of both b92.net and opennet.org (1999). The author further claims that the common feature of these activities were to monitor the activities of the media outlets’ employees, and that the most serious activities focused on explicit censorship of Radio B92’s servers and radio frequency jamming/station closure.

The author notes that to overcome the use of internet filters by the Serbian government and maintain access, the most effective strategies were to mirror the content on different servers, to change IP server numbers often and to use proxy servers to circumvent the filters. By advocating outside the domestic community with ICT, Radio B92 succeeded in rendering governmental censorship efforts useless.

Radio B92’s internet began in 1992 with the Yugoslav Academic Network for email services only. In 1996, Radio B92 established a leased ISP line with Amsterdam’s XS4ALL, and formed Opennet.org. As the author notes, “The link with XS4ALL was used since then for encrypted email transfers, distribution of the radio's news bulletins to thousand of email addresses worldwide. Apart from that, Opennet servers hosted a number of Web sites and discussion forums for various NGOs [non-governmental organisations], anti-war campaigns, feminist groups, etc”.

Challenges included overcoming the Serbian government’s use of internet filters, radio frequency jamming, station closures and the use of informants as a means of intimidation, during a full-scale civil-war.

By combining and alternating their strategy, in conjunction with external assistance and expertise, the collective resistance successfully managed to render the filters and other censorship activities ineffective.

Successful strategies to combat censorship included:

• Locating dissident media outside of the control of the domestic regime’s influence;
• Rapid dissemination of censorship activities to the public - early reporting created needed assistance for mirroring and proxy servers;
• The need for anonymity on the internet - governments are now awakening to the need for identification measures. This would reduce the ability for public acknowledgement of censorship activities among other public interests.